Legal Myths of Ebola Preparedness and Response by Hodge, James G., Jr.
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 29
Issue 2 Symposium: Regulating Life, Disease, and
Death
Article 2
2015
Legal Myths of Ebola Preparedness and Response
James G. Hodge Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
Part of the Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
29 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 355 (2015)
Legal Myths of Ebola Preparedness and Response
Cover Page Footnote
* Associate Dean and Professor of Public Health Law and Ethics; Director, Public Health Law and Policy
Program; Director, Network for Public Health Law—Western Region Office, Sandra Day O’Connor College
of Law, ASU. This manuscript is based in part on a keynote address for the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics
& Public Policy’s sympo- sium, Regulating Life, Disease, and Death, on Thursday, March 19, 2015. I would
like to acknowledge the following individuals with the Public Health Law and Policy Program, Sandra Day
O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University (ASU) for their research and editing assistance
throughout the production of this article: Greg Measer, Senior Legal Researcher and J.D. Candidate (2015);
Asha Agrawal, Senior Legal Researcher and J.D. Candidate (2016); and Matt Saria, Researcher and B.S.
Candidate (2016).
This article is available in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol29/iss2/2
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-2\NDE202.txt unknown Seq: 1 20-APR-15 15:16
ARTICLES
LEGAL MYTHS OF EBOLA PREPAREDNESS
AND RESPONSE
JAMES G. HODGE, JR., JD, LLM*
INTRODUCTION
In March 2014, Ebola viral disease (“EVD”) emerged from several
West African countries as a substantial threat to global health.1
Through a series of core legal powers pursuant to its declaration of a
public health emergency of international concern (“PHEIC”) on
August 8, 2014,2 the World Health Organization (“WHO”) averted a
global health disaster by requiring member countries to engage in mul-
tiple public health interventions.  These efficacious WHO-mandated
measures included implementation of border closures to limit the
spread of EVD within and outside of countries like Guinea,3 Liberia,4
Senegal,5 and Sierra Leone.6  Industrialized nations, including the
* Associate Dean and Professor of Public Health Law and Ethics; Director, Public
Health Law and Policy Program; Director, Network for Public Health Law—Western
Region Office, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, ASU. This manuscript is based in
part on a keynote address for the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy’s sympo-
sium, Regulating Life, Disease, and Death, on Thursday, March 19, 2015.  I would like to
acknowledge the following individuals with the Public Health Law and Policy Program,
Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University (ASU) for their research
and editing assistance throughout the production of this article: Greg Measer, Senior
Legal Researcher and J.D. Candidate (2015); Asha Agrawal, Senior Legal Researcher and
J.D. Candidate (2016); and Matt Saria, Researcher and B.S. Candidate (2016).
1. Outbreaks Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/resources/outbreak-table.html#one (last
updated Feb. 20, 2015).
2. Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola Outbreak
in West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/ [hereinafter IHR Emergency Committee
Statement].
3. Saliou Samb, Guinea Shuts Borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia in Bid to Halt Ebola,
REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2014, 11:09 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/09/uk-
health-ebola-borders-idUKKBN0G90DN 20140809.
4. Umaru Fofana, Sierra Leone Shuts Borders, Closes Schools to Fight Ebola, REUTERS
(June 11, 2014, 8:55 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/us-health-ebola-
leone-idUKKBN0EM2CG20140611.
5. Travel Restrictions, Flight Operations and Screening, INT’L SOS, https://www.interna-
tionalsos.com /ebola/index.cfm?content_id=435& (last updated Jan. 28, 2015).
6. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, A Special Statement by the President of the Republic of
Liberia (July 27, 2014), available at http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Special%20State
ment%20by%20President%20Ellen%20 Johnson%20Sirleaf%20-1_1.pdf.
355
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United States, responded swiftly as well through their own emergency
declarations.  Resulting emergency legal powers enabled strong coordi-
nation among federal, state, and local actors to systematically identify
and limit cases.  Among these powers, the federal Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) required state and local governments
to follow its national guidance on quarantine and isolation procedures
for persons exposed to or infected with EVD.7  This led to the justified
quarantine of health care workers (“HCWs”) returning from treating
Ebola patients in West African “hot zones.”8  In collaboration with
CDC, U.S. Customs and Border Control agents screened thousands of
incoming passengers at multiple domestic airports to find and contain
numerous, potential cases of EVD.9  The Food and Drug Administra-
tion (“FDA”) worked in real-time to authorize the use of an extensive
array of experimental tests or drugs proven effective in identifying cases
and treating EVD patients.10  These (and other) legally-supported
efforts worked in unison to control the spread of EVD, mitigate its
impacts, and protect the public’s health.
While EVD presents a very real global health threat, none of the
statements above are entirely true.  As discussed in this commentary,
these and other public health legal preparedness themes are more
myth than reality.  In actuality, WHO lacks comprehensive powers to
require member states to act even during emergencies.11  Border clo-
sures probably do more harm to the public’s health than good.12  The
federal government never declared a national state of emergency nor
did the public health system take a highly-coordinated approach in its
responses.  CDC did not require state and local governments to follow
its quarantine and isolation guidance. Not surprisingly, many states con-
sequently chose not to.13  Mandatory quarantine of HCWs coming back
7. Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola
Virus Exposure, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/exposure/monitoring-and-movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html (last updated
Dec. 24, 2014).
8. Press Release, Andrew Cuomo, Governor, N.Y., Governor Andrew Cuomo and
Governor Chris Christie Announce Additional Screening Protocols for Ebola at JFK and
Newark Liberty International Airports (Oct. 24, 2014) (on file with the N.Y. State Gover-
nor’s Press Office) [hereinafter Cuomo & Christie Press Release].
9. Lawrence O. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr. & Scott Burris, Is the United States Pre-
pared for Ebola?, 312 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2497, 2498 (2014).
10. Ebola Response Updates from FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda
.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/ucm410308
.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2015).
11. Danielle Renwick & Toni Johnson, The World Health Organization (WHO), COUN-
CIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/public-health-threats-and-
pandemics/world-health-organization-/p20003 (“The organization has limited authority
to enforce any of its findings or recommendations. . . .”).
12. S.A. Miller, A Top Health Expert Warns Against Closing Borders to Stop Ebola, WASH.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/6/a-top-health-
expert-warns-against-closing-borders-.
13. State Ebola Protocols, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www
.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/ebola.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2015).
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from West Africa was neither essential nor constitutional.14  While
potentially lawful, extensive airport screenings in multiple U.S. airports
did not detect many, if any, active cases of EVD.15  Although FDA
approved some experimental tests and drugs for EVD, the array and
actual number of approvals were very limited.  Those it did approve
have not been shown to be efficacious in detecting or treating EVD in
every case.16
Exposing these and other myths of public health legal prepared-
ness and response reveals some of the inherent political and societal
misunderstandings about the appropriate scope and use of public
health powers to stymie infectious disease threats like EVD.  In the
throes of a perceived infectious disease threat, the public’s understand-
ing of the powers of government can become distorted, propelled in
some cases by irresponsible, misinformed media.17  Regrettably, some
of these themes related to the legal roles of government seem to arise
in nearly every major, modern infectious disease health threat.18  Bust-
ing these myths may help obviate this cyclical trap through implementa-
tion of effective public health legal interventions to mitigate future
impacts on morbidity and mortality of infectious disease threats.
MYTH I. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION HAS EXTENSIVE
EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH POWERS TO RESPOND TO
INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS LIKE
EBOLA VIRAL DISEASE
As the most prominent international organization devoted to the
advancement of global health, WHO can presumably legally compel its
194 member states to adhere to best practices in public health espe-
cially during emergencies, like Ebola, when the potential for significant
14. Douwe Miedema & Fiona Ortiz, The Nurse Thrown Into Ebola Quarantine Is Plan-
ning To Sue Over ‘Unconstitutional’ Detention, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 26, 2014, 7:14 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/us-nurse-plans-to-sue-over-unconstitutional-ebola-quarantine-
2014-10#ixzz3OujMAaDP.
15. Liz Szabo, No Ebola Found in Airport Checks, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2014, at 3a.
16. Alan Mozes, Diagnosing Ebola: Why Isn’t There a Rapid, Reliable Test?, CBS NEWS
(Oct. 20, 2014, 2:12 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/diagnosing-ebola-why-isnt-
there-a-rapid-reliable-test/ (“[T]here is no test at all to determine Ebola infection in a
person without symptoms . . . [and a] PCR test typically takes at least 24 hours to bring
back results.”).
17. Dan Friedman & James Warren, Ebola Czar Ron Klain Is Still Out of Sight as N.Y.,
N.J. Defend Decision to Go Beyond CDC Guidelines, NY DAILY NEWS (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:41 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ebola-czar-ron-klain-sight-cdc-issues-guide-
lines-article-1.1989534 (“[T]he lack of a visible leader quarterbacking the Ebola effort,
coupled with the scattered, decentralized realities of the American health care system,
created a confounding muddle.”).
18. David P. Fidler et al., Through the Quarantine Looking Glass: Drug-Resistant Tuber-
culosis and Public Health Governance, Law, and Ethics, J.L. MED. & ETHICS  616, 620–21
(2007) (when exercising isolation and quarantine powers there is often “confusion about
which level of government should take the lead” and controversy surrounding compul-
sory powers, and that novel diseases sometimes highlight gaps in “legal power to act.”).
See also GEORGE J. ANNAS, WORST CASE BIOETHICS: DEATH, DISASTER, AND PUBLIC HEALTH
188, 214, 220–24, 230–32 (2010); James G. Hodge, Jr., The Evolution of Law in Bioprepared-
ness, 10 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 38, 43 (2012).
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losses of life and disability is heightened.19  In reality, WHO lacks com-
prehensive, enforceable legal powers to require member states to do
much of anything beyond what their leadership agrees to undertake
voluntarily.20  When it comes to enforcing global public health inter-
ventions, WHO cannot compel countries to act, relying instead on its
the power of persuasion to influence and recommend next steps.
Rather than carrying a “big stick,”21 WHO’s powers are more akin to
waving a finger of shame at offending nations and bodies.
It is not that WHO is completely powerless.  Pursuant to the Inter-
national Health Regulations (“IHRs”),22 revised in 2007, WHO works
collaboratively with national and regional public health agencies to
avert global health threats, issue emergency guidance, and seek compli-
ance from member nations.  After WHO Director-General Margaret
Chan declared a PHEIC in consultation with her Emergency Commit-
tee, WHO issued recommendations on various health measures to
affected members including isolation, quarantine, and travel restric-
tions.23  Failing to follow WHO guidance may result in financial conse-
quences or other ramifications for member countries.  Under
“exceptional circumstances,” for example, the World Health Assembly
may suspend the voting privileges and services to which members are
entitled.24  Collaboration between WHO and the World Trade Organi-
zation (“WTO”)25 increases the potential for trade sanctions for non-
compliance with international health norms.26  WHO’s access to
19. See, e.g., Lena H. Sun et al., Out of Control: How the World’s Health Organizations
Failed to Stop the Ebola Disaster, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/sf/national/2014/10/04/how-ebola-sped-out-of-control/; Mark J. Siedner & John
D. Kraemer, The Global Response to the Ebola Fever Epidemic: What Took So Long?, PLOS BLOGS
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2014/08/22/global-
response-ebola-fever-epidemic-took-long/.
20. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 110–11 (2014) (“[D]espite the
WHO’s impressive normative powers, modern international health law is remarkably
thin.”  Member states may opt out of “regulations enter[ed] into force for all members
. . . [if they] notify the D-G . . . within a specified time.”).
21. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, State of N.Y., to Henry L. Sprague
(Jan. 26, 1900) (on file with the American Treasures of the Library of Congress), available
at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm139.html (“I have always been fond of the
West African proverb: ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.’”).
22. World Health Organization, International Health Regulations art. 15, June 15,
2007, available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf.
23. IHR Emergency Committee Statement, supra note 2.
24. World Health Organization, CONST. art. VII (Oct. 2006), available at http://www
.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf.
25. The WTO and the World Health Organization, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto
.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_who_e.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (Although
no formal agreement exists between the organizations, WHO has “observer status” on
WTO committees and councils).
26. See GOSTIN, supra note 20, at 271, 297 (“[WTO] decisions significantly affect
global health. . . . [A]greements allow countries to restrict trade for the purposes of pro-
tecting health, while at the same time barring trade discrimination. . . . The IHR 2005 was
drafted to complement WTO law . . . .”); The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
art. XX (1947), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e
.htm (WTO members may restrict trade when “necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health.”).
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outside consultation and review27 helps ensure transparency and mem-
bers’ accountability as incentives toward compliance.28
Yet, international principles of national sovereignty prevent WHO
from requiring stronger adherence to its guidance through enhanced
penalties or enforcement among its members.29  Amidst insufficient
resources30 and heavy criticism for its lax approaches to controlling
infectious disease,31 WHO lacks the basic, fundamental powers and
resources it needs to more effectively prevent global health threats like
EVD.  The consequences of this international void are profound.32
Thousands of deaths related to EVD could have been prevented with
stronger global health governance from WHO.
MYTH II. BORDER CLOSURES ARE A LAWFUL PUBLIC HEALTH TOOL
TO HELP PREVENT THE SPREAD OF EBOLA
As a public health legal tool, border closures entail varying types of
prohibitions on individuals’ entry into or exit from countries or regions
27. Rita-Marie A. Brady, The Revised International Health Regulations: An Historical
Overview and an Analysis of Modern Application, 4 ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (Dec. 2007),
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/
brady.html.
28. Polly J. Price, Ebola and the Law in the United States: A Short Guide to Public Health
Authority and Practical Limits, EMORY LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 14-299 1, 4–5 (Dec.
2014).
Although the [IHRs] do not include an enforcement mechanism for States
which fail to comply with WHO recommendations, the potential consequences
of non-compliance are themselves a powerful tool [including] . . .  a tarnished
international image, increased morbidity/mortality in affected populations, uni-
lateral travel and trade restrictions by other nations, and economic and social
disruption. Working with WHO to control a public health event such as Ebola
can help prevent reflexive, unnecessary, and counter-productive border closings
and economic disruption.
Id.
29. David P. Fidler, Globalization, International Law, and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 77, 80 (1996).
The central importance of the state and its sovereignty constitutes a basic weak-
ness in international law because international legal rules tend to reflect the
compromises necessary to achieve agreement and the unwillingness of states to
restrict their freedom of action through international law. . . . The alleged fail-
ure of the [IHRs] may be due to the failure of WHO member states to fulfill the
duties they accepted. Neither the regulations nor WHO has any power to
enforce compliance.
Id.
30. GOSTIN, supra note 20, at 90 (“WHO Director-General, Margret Chan,
announced a $300 million budget deficit for 2010-2011 . . . .”); Stephanie Nebehay, WHO
Says Cash Crunch, Rains Could Thwart Ebola Efforts, REUTERS AFRICA (Jan. 23, 2015, 4:28
PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN0KW1RW20150123?feedType=
RSS&feedName=topNews (“WHO is set to run out of cash in mid-February, a key period
as it tries to halt the deadly disease, a senior WHO official said.”).
31. GOSTIN, supra note 20, at 113 (“WHO has eschewed norm setting, preferring
scientific and technical solutions to the deep-seated problems of global health. . . . Promi-
nent scholars have chastised the WHO for its reluctance to create binding norms . . . .”).
32. Id. at 100, 121–26.
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via land, air, or water.33  When EVD initially threatened to enter the
United States, for example, multiple federal lawmakers on Capitol Hill
demanded President Obama employ closure strategies to limit its intro-
duction.34  Despite their historic, common use during infectious dis-
ease outbreaks in the past,35 President Obama and WHO consistently
recommended against border closures in response to Ebola.36  Still,
such measures have been used extensively in countries directly
impacted by EVD, as well as by those seeking to prevent its importation.
On June 11, 2014, Sierra Leone closed its borders with Guinea and
Liberia to bolster containment efforts.37  On July 27, Liberia closed all
but three of its border entry points to screen travelers for EVD.38
Guinea closed its borders on August 9, 2014 immediately after WHO
declared a PHEIC.39  Senegal closed its land borders with Guinea and
air borders with Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.40  As of late Octo-
ber 2014, several countries, including Canada41 and Australia,42
33. Security Message for U.S. Citizens: Dakar (Senegal), Border Closures Due to Ebola Virus
Disease, OVERSEAS SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.osac.gov/pages/
ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=16206.
34. Patricia Zengerle & Roberta Rampton, In U.S. Congress, Republicans Step Up
Demands for Ebola Travel Ban, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2014, 5:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/10/16/us-health-ebola-usa-politics-idUSKCN0I52TE20141016 (“Republican
lawmakers . . . ramp[ed] up their demands that President Barack Obama impose new
restrictions on travel from countries ravaged by [Ebola].”).
35. See CDC Telebriefing on Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION (July 28, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/
t0728-ebola.html; Drew Hinshaw & Betsy Mckay, West Africa Strains to Contain Ebola Virus,
WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/liberia-shuts-borders-
amid-ebola-outbreak-1406568519; Influenza Pandemic in Australia 1918-19, Melbourne Statis-
tics, AUSTRALIAN POSTAL HIST. & STAT., http://www.auspostalhistory.com/articles/
1123.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2014); Sue Chan, China Blocks Borders Over SARS, CBS NEWS
(May 2, 2003, 4:49 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-blocks-borders-over-sars;
Kate Saunders, Tibet Border with Nepal Closed to Prevent Spread of SARS, PHAYUL.COM (Apr.
27, 2003, 10:30 AM), http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=4104&t=1; Michael
Wines, The SARS Epidemic: Moscow; Russia Urges Travel Limit On Suspicion Of SARS Case, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/09/world/the-sars-epidemic-
moscow-russia-urges-travel-limit-on-suspicion-of-sars-case.html.
36. WORLD HEALTH ORG., TRAVEL AND TRANSPORT RISK ASSESSMENT: INTERIM GUI-
DANCE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITIES AND TRANSPORT SECTOR (2014), available at http:/
/www.who.int/ith/updates/20140421/en/; No US Travel Ban Over Ebola – Obama, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2014, 10:28 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-29674514
(“US President Barack Obama has ruled out imposing a travel ban on Ebola-hit countries
of West Africa.”).
37. Fofana, supra note 4.
38. Sirleaf, supra note 6.
39. Samb, supra note 3.
40. Travel Restrictions, Flight Operations and Screening, supra note 5.
41. Ralph Ellis, Canada to Stop Processing Visas from Ebola Hot Spots in West Africa, CNN
(Oct. 31, 2014, 6:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/31/world/world-ebola-out
break.
42. Euan McKirdy, Australia Instigates Ebola-Prompted Ban on Travel from West Africa,
CNN (Oct. 28, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/28/world/asia/australia-
immigration-policy-ebola/.
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stopped issuing visas to persons from the regions most affected by
EVD.43
Temporary border closures have the potential to derail the flow of
Ebola cases into a country, but they can also limit importation of
HCWs,44 food, and medical supplies to needed areas,45 effectively cut-
ting off impacted regions in contravention to human rights protec-
tions.46  Without sufficient enforcement (which can be nearly
impossible to assure especially between adjacent countries sharing sig-
nificant land boundaries), border closures may be easily evaded and
rendered useless in controlling the spread of infectious diseases.47
Even if border closures and related flight restrictions delay the spread
of infectious disease, they do not eliminate the risk of spread entirely.48
If the objective of border closures is to stop the flow of disease to pro-
tect communities, the effect more often is merely to slow it down
through measures that carry significant collateral public health harms
to affected populations.
MYTH III. THE THREAT OF EBOLA CONSTITUTED A PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES
Judging from many Americans’ initial reactions to the domestic
presence of EVD in late September 2014, fueled in large part by the
media, one may rightfully presume the country was in a full state of
emergency.  Members of Congress, state governors and legislators, and
others called on President Obama and his administration to scale up
EVD response efforts after the arrival of the first domestic case.49  Presi-
43. Travel Restrictions, Flight Operations and Screening, supra note 5 (Australia, Belize,
Canada, and Guyana suspended issuance of visas to individuals from Ebola-infected
countries).
44. Heidi Vogt, Travel Restrictions Hamper African Medical Staff in Ebola Fight, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2014, 12:44 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/travel-restrictions-ham-
per-african-medical-staff-in-ebola-fight-1414086147.
45. Miller, supra note 12.
46. Marcelo Giugale, The Economic Impact of Ebola, WORLD POST (last updated Dec. 8,
2014 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marcelo-giugale/the-economic-impact-
of-eb_b_5951458.html.
47. Tom Odula & Lynsey Chutel, Africa Stems Ebola Via Border Closings, Luck, YAHOO
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/africa-stems-ebola-via-border-
closings-luck-182548855.html; Charlotte Alter, Liberia Closes Borders to Curb Ebola Outbreak,
TIME (July 28, 2014), http://time.com/3046012/liberia-border-ebola/.
48. In 2006, researchers used a large-scale epidemic simulation to examine poten-
tial intervention options to address a novel influenza outbreak in Great Britain or the
United States. See Neil M. Ferguson et al., Strategies for Mitigating an Influenza Pandemic,
442 NATURE 448, 449 (2006). Researchers found that border restrictions, even if 99.9%
effective, may delay the peak of the United States pandemic by six weeks, but would not
prevent the spread entirely. Id.  Another study examined the spread of flu following
flight restrictions due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  John S. Brownstein et al., Empirical
Evidence for the Effect of Airline Travel on Inter-Regional Influenza Spread in the United States, 3
PLOS MED. 1826, 1826 (2006).  The peak date of 2001–2002 flu season in the United
States was delayed by approximately one month, an effect not seen in France where flight
restrictions were not imposed. Id. at 1829–30, 1832.
49. Gregory Korte, Special Report: America’s Perpetual State of Emergency, USA TODAY
(Oct. 23, 2014, 9:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/22/
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dent Obama responded in part by classifying the international and
domestic threat of EVD as a national security priority.50  Still, despite
the declaration of a PHEIC by WHO, neither President Obama51 nor
Secretary Sylvia Burwell of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (“DHHS”) declared a national public health emergency in
response to EVD.  Secretary Burwell has the legal authority to make this
declaration unilaterally, although typically it is issued with presidential
input and assent.52  Unlike her predecessor, DHHS Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius, who authorized a state of public health emergency for months
in response to the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009–2010,53 Burwell
has not followed a similar route.54  Instead, she issued a very limited
president-obama-states-of-emergency/16851775/; Arlette Saenz & John Parkinson, 4
Things Some DC Lawmakers Want Obama to Do About Ebola, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014, 12:02
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/10/4-things-some-dc-lawmakers-want-
obama-to-do-about-ebola/.
Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, thinks congressional leaders should call Congress back
to Washington for an emergency session to examine a temporary Ebola travel
ban. “The top priority should be to protect health and safety of American citi-
zens,” Cruz said on Fox News Thursday night. “We need to do more, we’re not
doing enough. If the president won’t act, then Congress should reconvene and
Congress should act to protect the American people.”
Id.
50. See, e.g., Gregg Jarrett, If Obama Thinks Ebola is a ‘National Security Priority,’ Why
No Travel Ban?, FOX NEWS (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/10/
03/if-obama-thinks-ebola-is-national-security-priority-why-no-travel-ban/. (“President
Obama declared the Ebola outbreak a ‘national security priority.’ That was three weeks
ago. Yet, he has failed to treat it as such.”); Connor Adams Sheets, Obama: Ebola Outbreak A
‘National Security Threat’ With ‘Low Margin For Error’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014, 6:27
PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/obama-ebola-outbreak-national-security-threat-low-mar-
gin-error-video-1705773.
President Barack Obama said that the Ebola outbreak is a “national security
threat” with “low margin for error” during extended remarks. . . . [Additionally
the President noted that ] “it is very important for us to make sure that we are
treating this the same way that we would treat any other significant national
security threat . . . [a]nd that’s why we’ve got an all-hands-on-deck approach —
from [the Department of Defense] to public health to our development assis-
tance, our science teams — everybody is putting in time and effort to make sure
that we are addressing this as aggressively as possible.”
Id.
51. Press Briefing, James S. Brady, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Press
Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Oct. 16, 2014, 1:08 PM), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/16/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-
10162014 (President Obama is not “actively considering [a national health emergency]
right now.”); Korte, supra note 49 (Though he would not rule out the possibility of an
emergency declaration in the future, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest stated that
it is “not something that we’re actively considering right now.”).
52. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage
during Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 259 (2008).
53. 2009 H1N1 Flu Outbreak: Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, PUB.
HEALTH EMERGENCY, http://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/
h1n1.aspx (last updated Mar. 22, 2010).
54. Press Briefing, supra note 51.
We’ve had senior officials like Secretary Burwell . . . talk about these kinds of
facts [about Ebola].  [A] full understanding of the risk will help people under-
stand why this is something they don’t need to be concerned about.  [T]he
proper way to meet that concern or to address that concern is to make sure they
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declaration on December 9, 2014, under the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness (“PREP”) Act,55 in support of the develop-
ment of Ebola vaccines.56
DHHS’ failure to declare a public health emergency in response to
EVD is curious, but also legally defensible.  It is curious because Ebola,
like H1N1, is a highly-infectious, killer virus that garnered significant
national attention as initial cases arose in the U.S.  Unlike the airborne
H1N1 flu virus, however, EVD spreads considerably less easily.  How-
ever, EVD is contagious and lethal even with the availability of modern
isolation units and round-the-clock health care services for patients.57
These epidemiologic facts would seem to support a declaration of a
national state of public health emergency from the moment known
cases of EVD arose in the States.  Similar emergencies have been
declared for supposedly lesser threats, including waterborne out-
breaks58 and severe storms.59  Why was it not declared in this case?
First, public health emergency declarations are typically based on
known or imminent threats of substantial harms to the population.60  A
handful of domestic cases of a non-airborne, slowly-spreading condition
like EVD does not constitute an imminent threat to the larger popula-
tion’s health.  Very few cases of EVD arose domestically, and only two
people have died in the U.S. from EVD as of January 30, 2015.61  More
people may be at risk of death from measles in the United States from
the recent Disneyland outbreak in December 2014 than EVD.62  Sec-
have a full accounting of the facts. I’m not aware of any consideration that cur-
rently is underway [related] to the Stafford Act or any sort of national medical
emergency.
Id.
55. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (“PREP”) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
148, 119 Stat. 2818 (codified at Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e).
56. Press Release, Sylvia M. Burwell, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Secretary
Burwell Issues Declaration under PREP Act to Support Development of Ebola Vaccines
(Dec. 9, 2014), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/12/20141209a
.html.
57. Ebola Spreads Slower, Kills More Than Other Diseases, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/health/how-ebola-spreads/ (showing
that one person infected with influenza will pass the virus on to 2–6 people while a
patient infected with Ebola will, on average, only pass the virus on to 1.5–2 people).
58. Colo. Exec. Order No. D 006 08 (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.colorado.gov/cs/
Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mun
goBlobs&blobwhere=1228626288626&ssbinary=true.
59. Press Release, Mike Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., HHS
Secretary Declares Public Health Emergency for Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and Ala-
bama (Aug. 31, 2008) (on file with DHHS).
60. Hodge & Anderson, supra note 52.
61. Lena H. Sun & Brady Dennis, Death of Second Ebola Patient in U.S. Shows Need for
Early, Accurate Tests, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/national/health-science/death-of-second-ebola-patient-in-us-shows-need-for-early-
accurate-tests-experts-say/2014/11/17 /b114 07 a0-6e84-11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story
.html.
62. Rosanna Xia, California Measles Outbreak is Up to 87 Cases in 7 States, Mexico, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015, 5:14 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-california-
measles-outbreak-87-cases-20150126-story.html (documenting the recent Disney measles
outbreak has infected 86 people in the U.S., and one person in Mexico); Liz Szabo, Dis-
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ond, neither DHHS nor most states (only Connecticut declared a state
of public health emergency)63 needed to issue any declaration to
implement a plethora of routine public health powers (e.g., education,
testing, screening, treatment, quarantine, isolation, closures) to address
existing threats of EVD.  Absent additional implications of EVD related
to resource limitations, DHHS and its subsidiary agencies like CDC,
FDA, and the National Institutes of Health can still respond legally.
Despite calls for greater national focus on EVD and President Obama’s
short-lived naming of an internal “Ebola Czar” Ron Klain in October
2014,64 federal, state, and local public health authorities decided
appropriately against issuing formal emergency declarations.  The per-
ception of EVD as constituting a domestic emergency is fiction; the
truth is that public health agencies and officials routinely handle
threats like these across the country.
MYTH IV. THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM TOOK A
COORDINATED APPROACH IN ADDRESSING
EBOLA VIRAL DISEASE
Criticisms of federal public health entities,65 and CDC particu-
larly,66 for failures to prevent all cases of EVD from entering or prolifer-
ating in the United States were often grounded in the notion that our
neyland Measles Outbreak Continues to Spread, USA TODAY (Jan. 18, 2015, 3:14 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/01/18/disney-measles-spreads/21953767/ (The
outbreak has the potential to develop into  “one of the worst outbreaks since 1989.“);
Complications of Measles, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc
.gov/measles /about/complications.html (last updated Nov. 3, 2014) (citing the measles
fatality rate in the U.S. as 1–2 of every 1,000 children that contract the virus).
63. Letter from Dunnel P. Malloy, Governor, State of Connecticut, to the Honora-
ble Denise Merrill, Sec’y of the State, Martin J. Dunleavy, Clerk of the State House of
Representatives, & Garey E. Coleman, Clerk of the State Senate (Oct. 7. 2014), available at
http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/lib/malloy/2014.10.07_Declaration_of_Public_
Health_Emergency.pdf.
64. Carol E. Lee, Obama to Name Ron Klain as Ebola Czar, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj
.com/articles/obama-to-name-ron-klain-as-ebola-czar-1413557184 (last updated Oct. 17,
2014, 3:32 PM).
65. Michael Grunwald, How a ‘Czar’ Fights a Disease, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 19, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/ron-klain-what-the-white-house-did-
to-fight-ebola-114325_Page2.html#.VMF4xcY7VUQ; Ali Elkin, Jeb Bush Criticizes Obama on
Ebola, ISIS, Life in General, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Oct. 29, 2014, 7:23 AM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-10-29/jeb-bush-criticizes-obama-on-ebola-isis-life-
in-general; Andrew Siddens, Panel’s G.O.P. Chairman Steps Up Criticism of Ebola Response,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/us/politics/adminis-
trations-ebola-response-draws-scrutiny-of-house-committee.html; Rebecca Kaplan, Could
the U.S. Have Done More to Prevent Ebola from Arriving?, CBS NEWS (Oct. 1, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-could-the-u-s-have-done-more-to-prevent-it-from-
arriving/.
66. Ron Carucci, What We Learned from CDC’s Handling of Ebola, CNBC (Nov. 3,
2014, 11:40 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102146727#; Alex Berezow, CDC Lost Its Ebola
Gamble: Column, USA TODAY (Oct. 24, 2014, 8:37 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
opinion/2014/10/23/cdc-ebola-gamble-public-confidence-trust-truth-not-clueless-czar-
column/17800077/; Julie Steenhuysen, U.S. CDC Head Criticized for Blaming ‘Protocol
Breach’ as Nurse Gets Ebola, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/10/13/us-health-ebola-usa-nurse-idUSKCN0I206820141013.
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national public health system is a well-coordinated, finely-tuned
machine.  It is not.  In our federalist system of government, the powers
to protect the public’s health are split among varied levels of govern-
ment.  The federal government holds the purse strings for many public
health funds, which it doles out largely to state and local governments
which historically and contemporaneously hold specific public health
powers are historically and contemporaneously vested in state and local
governments.67  They are the traditional protectors of the public’s
health in part because they possess the broadest range of public health
powers.68
The responsibility of assuring the nation that EVD was under con-
trol fell to federal public health entities like CDC, whose officials were
relied on to educate the public on Ebola. Achieving this objective, how-
ever, is more so the responsibility of state and local governments work-
ing on the frontlines of public health preparedness in concert with
doctors, nurses, emergency medical service providers, and other health
care entities.  Inherent weaknesses of our federalist public health sys-
tem were revealed through the significant errors in the handling of
patient, Thomas Eric Duncan, the first domestic case of EVD at Texas
Health Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas, Texas.  Multiple gaffes among
public health and clinical personnel led to a host of harms, including
the subsequent infection of two treating nurses with EVD at the hospi-
tal.69  One of the nurses, Nina Pham, subsequently sued her employer
alleging an array of public health offenses directly causing her harm.70
Additional illustrations abound from other failures to apply known, effi-
cacious best practices in emergency preparedness through state or local
actors.71  Even when a nationally-coordinated, finely-tuned approach is
needed to instill trust in the community against a perceived serious
threat like Ebola, it may simply be unattainable.
67. JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 31–34 (2013); see also
Barnini Chakraborty, As Ebola Fears Spread, States Take Emergency Response into Their Own
Hands, FOX NEWS (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/10/22/as-
ebola-fears-spread-states-take-emergency-response-into-their-own-hands/ (“Not satisfied
with the federal response, several states are taking the Ebola crisis into their own hands –
tapping emergency funds in their budgets, launching treatment units and holding public
hearings to stanch the spread of misinformation about the virus.”).
68. HODGE, supra note 67, at 33–34.
69. Ebola: Hospital Mistakes Blamed for US Transmission, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2014,
4:33 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-29590832.
70. Jennifer Emily, Free of Ebola, But Not Fear, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Feb. 28,
2015), http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives.nina-pham/.
71. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Law, Medicine, and Public Health Preparedness: The Case
of Ebola, 130 PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 1, 1 (2015) (In addition to the initial release of
Duncan, leading to the potential spread of EVD until his readmission, one of Duncan’s
nurses who contracted the disease was allowed to fly on a commercial airline despite the
presence of possible symptoms. She was later diagnosed with EVD.).
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MYTH V. FEDERAL QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION GUIDANCE
CONCERNING EBOLA MUST BE CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Perhaps one of the best examples of the limits of national coordi-
nation in EVD response arose from the national call for greater clarifi-
cation on the use of quarantine and isolation powers.72  These ancient
social distancing powers are often conflated, but are in fact distinct.
Quarantine refers to the separation of persons exposed to communica-
ble conditions (but not yet known to be infectious) from those not
exposed or infectious.73  Isolation refers to the separation of persons
who are infectious with such a condition from those who are not.74
Thus, a person who may have come into direct contact with bodily
fluids of an EVD patient may be quarantined.  An actual EVD patient,
however, is isolated.
On October 24, 2014, Governors Cuomo (D. New York) and Chris-
tie (R. New Jersey) jointly declared their intent to mandatorily quaran-
tine, for up to three weeks, any HCW returning to their respective
jurisdictions from treating EVD patients in West Africa.75  Those deter-
mined to have contracted EVD would be isolated and treated.  Impos-
ing a limited quarantine on all returning HCWs from Ebola hot zones
may seem wise in the interests of protecting the public’s health, but it
exceeded best practices underlying the use of these powers.  As dis-
cussed further below, typically quarantine is justified only when one’s
exposure to a contagious condition is coupled with other indicators of
potential infection (e.g., fever, nausea, or known instances of unpro-
tected and direct exposure to EVD).  Absent these or other known fac-
tors, the wholesale quarantine of HCWs lacks a sufficient public health
basis.
After the joint announcement in New York and New Jersey, CDC
quickly disseminated its own guidance on the appropriate risk catego-
ries and corresponding interventions to justify specific quarantine and
isolation measures.76  Providing uniform national guidance would
allegedly deter deleterious public health practices among state and
local governments.  In reality, CDC’s guidance was considered and sum-
marily rejected in part by nearly a dozen states, including populous
states like California, Florida, New York, and Texas, which set divergent
criteria or thresholds for the application of quarantine and isolation in
72. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33201, FEDERAL AND STATE QUARAN-
TINE AND ISOLATION AUTHORITY (2014), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
homesec/RL33201.pdf.
73. HODGE, supra note 67, at 94.
74. Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law,
and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 171 (2007).
75. Cuomo & Christie Press Release, supra note 8.
76. Epidemiologic Risk Factors to Consider When Evaluating a Person for Exposure to Ebola
Virus, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/
exposure/risk-factors-when-evaluating-person-for-exposure.html (last updated Nov. 28,
2014).
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their jurisdictions.77  Media and others questioned how states could fail
to follow CDC guidance.78  It is quite easy.  Outside the context of a
federally-declared emergency or the existence of a federal funding
stream for which state adherence is tied to federal conditions via the
constitutional spending powers,79 state public health authorities gener-
ally do not have to follow CDC guidance.  They are entitled to go their
own way consistent with their sovereign public health legal powers, as
demonstrated further in the myth below.
MYTH VI. MANDATORY QUARANTINE OF HEALTH CARE WORKERS FROM
EBOLA “HOT ZONES” IS LAWFUL AND ESSENTIAL
On Friday, October 24, 2014, New Jersey Governor Christie deter-
mined that nurse Kaci Hickox must be quarantined.80  Hickox had
tested positive with an elevated fever via screening at the Newark Inter-
national Airport where she returned from multiple weeks abroad treat-
ing EVD patients in Sierra Leone.  In collaboration with state public
health authorities and amidst a developing media circus just about a
week prior to his re-election, Governor Christie ordered Hickox to
remain in a hastily-built tent located adjacent to University Hospital in
Newark.  For over 60 hours, Hickox was physically separated from fam-
ily, friends, and her lawyer behind a canvas tent with plastic windows
while being monitored regularly for additional signs of Ebola
infection.81
When no additional symptoms surfaced and she threatened to sue,
Hickox was allowed on Monday, October 27, to return to her residence
in her native state of Maine which she shared with her boyfriend.82
77. JAMES G. HODGE, JR., NETWORK PUB. HEALTH L., EMERGENCY LEGAL PREPARED-
NESS CONCERNING EBOLA: A PRIMER (2014), available at https://www.networkforphl.org/
_asset/dzf8u4/Ebola-Outbreak-2014—-Network-Overview.pdf (these states include CA,
FL, GA, IL, IN, LA, ME, MD, NH, NJ, NY, OH, TX, VA).
78. Philip M. Boffey, C.D.C. Ebola Guidelines Aren’t Good Enough for Some States, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014, 4:35 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/c-d-c-
ebola-guidelines-arent-good-enough-for-some-states/ (noting that while CDC “hoped that
its rules would head off the confusion resulting from separate state-by-state policies”
eleven states still released diverging guidelines within one week of the release of the CDC
guidance); Toluse Olorunnipa & Angela Greiling Keane, White House Says States Can’t be
Forced to Follow CDC, ILL. NEWS, http://ilinnews.com/white-house-says-states-cant-be-
forced-to-follow-cdc/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
79. HODGE, supra note 67, at 111–14; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that a statutory provision providing DHHS Secretary authority
to penalize States choosing not to participate in the Act’s expansion of Medicaid program
exceeded Congress’ spending power); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (hold-
ing that a statute conditioning receipt of select highway funds on adoption of minimum
drinking age is valid use of Congress’ spending power).
80. Anemona Hartocollis & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Tested Negative for Ebola, Nurse
Criticizes Her Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/
26/nyregion/nurse-in-newark-tests-negative-for-ebola.html?_r=0.
81. Id.
82. Liz Robbins, Michael Barbaro & Marc Santora, Unapologetic, Christie Frees Nurse
From Ebola Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/
28/nyregion/nurse-in-newark-to-be-allowed-to-finish-ebola-quarantine-at-home-christie-
says.html.
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Health and law enforcement officials closely monitored them both.
Maine Governor Paul LePage and Health Commissioner Mary Mayhew
promptly attempted to impose a mandatory 21-day “home quarantine”
court order83 on Hickox after she and her boyfriend left the house to
take a bike ride.84  The proclaimed basis for the order extended from
the significant need to protect the community’s health from the specter
of Ebola tied to Hickox and other HCWs.  After a similarly-situated
HCW, Dr. Craig Spencer, was determined to be EVD positive just 24
hours after roaming around varied destinations in New York City,85
Maine’s limited quarantine against Hickox seemed necessary and legiti-
mate from a public health perspective.
The only problem is that use of quarantine powers in this case was
unlawful.  On October 31, 2013, a district court judge found in State of
Maine Department of Health and Human Services v. Hickox86 that the State
lacked “clear and convincing evidence” that Hickox posed sufficient
risks to the community to support its mandatory quarantine.87
Hickox’s initial high temperature reading at the airport proved to be an
anomaly.  She evinced no further symptoms of EVD from that moment
forward.  Lacking any additional proof of harm related to Hickox, who
promised public health authorities to continue to self-monitor her con-
dition until the end of the incubation period, her quarantine was
unnecessary and thus unlawful.88
83. Mayhew v. Hickox, No. FORDC-CV-2014-36, 2014 U.S. Dist. (D. Maine Oct. 31,
2014) (temporary order), available at http://www.courts.maine.gov/news_reference/high
_profile/hickox/temporary_order.pdf [hereinafter Mayhew Temporary Order]
84. Jennifer Levitz, Nurse Defies Ebola Quarantine in Maine, WALL ST. J. (last updated
Oct. 30, 2014, 7:13 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nurse-defies-ebola-quarantine-in-
maine-takes-a-bike-ride-1414678589.
85. Faith Karimi, From Guinea to the U.S.: Timeline of First Ebola Patient in New York
City, CNN (Oct. 25, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/24/health/new-york-
ebola-timeline/; see also Grunwald, supra note 65 (“The case of Dr. Craig Spencer in New
York was a big learning moment for people. You had someone come back, an American
citizen doing heroic work in West Africa.  He had Ebola.  He came back to New York, he
rode the subway, he went bowling, he ate out, he spent time with his fiance´e and friends.
He was quickly identified and treated superbly at Bellevue Hospital.  And the bottom line
was: No one but Craig Spencer got Ebola. Not the people who rode the subway with him,
not the people who bowled with him, not his friends, not the courageous doctors and
nurses who treated him.  Nobody got Ebola.”).
86. Mayhew Temporary Order, supra note 83, at 2.
87. Id.
88. Contra In re Washington, 735 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Wis. 2007).  A homeless woman
with TB who failed to adhere to directly-observed therapy was jailed because she posed a
threat to the public’s health.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld her confinement
because the jail was “a place where proper care and treatment [would] be provided [and]
the spread of disease [would] be prevented,” with no less restrictive means available. Id.;
see also City of New York v. Antoinette, 630 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (allowing
forcible detention of person with active TB in hospital based on clear and convincing
evidence that detention was necessary); HODGE, supra note 67, at 85–86.
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MYTH VII. AIRPORT SCREENING PRACTICES ARE EFFICACIOUS IN
DETECTING AND PREVENTING IMPORTATION OF EBOLA CASES
The Hickox case leads nicely into another myth of public health
legal preparedness for EVD surrounding the use of airport screening
practices.  Facing political pressure from Congress and intense media
scrutiny, the federal government announced on October 8, 2014 that
enhanced screening for EVD would be conducted at five domestic air-
ports that receive nearly all of the passengers arriving from Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and Guinea (albeit indirectly following other interna-
tional flights).89  Additional countries like Mali were later added (and
then removed) from the list.90  Even though these passengers were
screened for EVD just hours before prior to getting on board their des-
tination flights from West Africa, federal agents escorted these passen-
gers on arrival in the United States to a designated area, took their
temperature with a noncontact thermometer, observed them for other
symptoms, and inquired about their health and exposure history.91
Anyone fitting a risk profile, like Hickox, was subjected to further evalu-
ation by CDC health officers who eventually handed thousands of high
risk passengers off to state or local public health agents for additional
monitoring for up to three weeks (depending on the length of the pas-
sengers’ stay).92
Airport entry screening for EVD represented the first time in mod-
ern recollection that fever monitoring was used nationally to detect and
89. Enhanced Ebola Screening to Start at Five U.S. Airports for All People Entering U.S. from
Ebola-Affected Countries, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/
news/2014/10/08/enhanced-ebola-screening-start-five-us-airports-all-people-entering-us-
ebola.  Additional screening practices at U.S. borders were also conducted as part of this
strategy to detect and deter incoming cases. See, e.g., Murphy Woodhouse, 13 African Trav-
elers Screened for Ebola at Nogales Ports, NOGALES INT’L (Jan. 8, 2015, 4:27 PM), http://www
.nogalesinternational.com/news/african-travelers-screened-for-ebola-at-nogales-ports/
article_da6e8aee-978d-11e4-a821-579889ab2466.html (noting that additional Ebola
screening at land ports is required if federal Border Patrol officers have “reason to believe
(a person) has been present in Liberia, Sierra Leone or Guinea in the preceding 21
days”).
90. Enhanced Airport Entry Screening to End for Travelers from Mali to the United States,
U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/
2015/p0105-enhanced-airport-screening.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2015).
91. Fact Sheet: Screening and Monitoring Travelers to Prevent the Spread of Ebola, U.S.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/travelers/
ebola-screening-factsheet.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2015).
92. Grunwald, supra note 65 (“[The federal government] pursued something we’ve
never done before, which is to identify who starts traveling there, and when they come to
America, the customs officer who processes their passport has identified them in advance,
is looking for that person, sends them to a screening facility that we’ve got at the five
airports where we funnel all these passengers.  Then, CDC experts take their tempera-
tures, identify if they have any risks [and what] . . . their activities have been in West
Africa.  They assign each individual a unique identifying number, hand them a 30-day cell
phone, and then we communicate that information directly to [state or local] public
health authorities, so we can track that person every day for the first 21 days in the county,
make sure we get their temperature twice a day, find them if we need to find them and
get them quickly to the right hospital if they turn out to be sick.  And that monitoring and
tracking system has been the backbone of what’s protected the country from further
Ebola cases.”).
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deter persons arriving to the United States with an infectious condi-
tion.93  While purportedly lawful,94 these screening procedures are also
wasteful, specious, and harmful to the public’s health.  They are waste-
ful in the sense that no known American patient with Ebola to date has
been identified through these practices.95  They are specious to the
extent they do not materially improve border security against Ebola
because they are prone to false positives (e.g., Hickox) and evasion
(e.g., Duncan lied about his exposure to EVD during his exit screening
in Liberia).96  Such screening practices have the potential to harm the
public’s health by driving EVD cases underground or across borders in
ways that cannot be detected.97
MYTH VIII. EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, VACCINES, AND DRUGS ARE
LAWFULLY USED TO COMBAT EBOLA VIRAL DISEASE
As a global leader in pharmaceutical research and development,
surely some U.S. company has developed a test, vaccine, or drug that is
efficacious and available to detect, deter, or treat EVD.  This may be
true, but the extent to which these experimental resources may be
authorized for use is more myth than fact.  There are many lawful ave-
nues for approval of experimental tests, vaccines, and drugs through
FDA.  Yet significant legal hoops and limitations on the use of these
options restrict the numbers of tests, vaccines, and drugs that may pro-
93. Sabrina Tavernise, Newly Vigilant, U.S. Will Screen Fliers for Ebola, N.Y. Times (Oct.
8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/us/newly-vigilant-us-is-to-screen-fliers-
for-ebola.html.
94. Federal authorities are statutorily authorized to screen passengers for a series of
infectious diseases, including EVD, via the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 264, and
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44901.  However, if screening
practices are demonstrated to lack efficacy related to furthering any legitimate public
health objective, they may be challenged as an unconstitutional invasion of bodily privacy
in violation of the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches (at least
as applied to U.S. citizens). See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(holding that alcohol and drug testing of employees is reasonable and consistent with the
need to protect public safety); Glover v. Eastern Neb. Cmty. Office of Retardation, 867
F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that employee testing for Hepatitis B and HIV did not
unconstitutionally invade privacy because the risk to patients was insufficient); City of
Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 763(2010) (stating the Court’s continued refusal “to
declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment”).  No challenge to federal screening practices for EVD has been
filed in any federal or state court based on a search for relevant cases as of January 21,
2015.
95. Szabo, supra note 15.
96. Norimitsu Onishi & Marc Santora, Ebola Patient in Dallas Lied on Screening Form,
Liberian Airport Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
10/03/world/africa/dallas-ebola-patient-thomas-duncan-airport-screening.html; Non-Con-
tact Temperature Measurement Devices: Considerations for Use in Port of Entry Screening Activities,
U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://
wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/pdf/ebola-non-contact-temperature-measurement-guidance.pdf.
97. Sharon Begley, Prescription for Avoiding Ebola Airport Screening: Ibuprofen, REUTERS
(Oct. 3, 2014, 1:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/03/us-health-ebola-
screening-idUSKCN0HS09J20141003 (“People who contract Ebola in West Africa can get
through airport screenings and onto a plane with a lie [on airport questionnaires] and a
lot of ibuprofen [to reduce fever]. . . .”).
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vide meaningful benefits, notwithstanding sometimes considerable risks
underlying their use.
While FDA approved several diagnostic tests and drugs to detect or
treat EVD, these authorizations are variant and highly-limited.  To date,
FDA has not approved any vaccines or drugs that are known to prevent
or efficaciously treat EVD.98  Several investigational products were
approved under FDA’s emergency use authorization (“EUA”) powers
via the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.99  For example, FDA
issued several EUAs for diagnostic tests (otherwise unapproved for gen-
eral use) to detect EVD patients with greater speed and specificity.100
Each EUA details specific limitations on the type of specimens to be
tested (e.g. blood, plasma, or urine), the population intended for use
(e.g. “at risk” or exposed individuals), and the types of instruments or
qualified laboratories capable of handling the collected specimens.101
FDA can also authorize the use of an emergency investigational
new drug (“IND”) to treat individuals when manufacturers or medical
teams seek and obtain approval.  In response to EVD, for example, FDA
granted IND applications for drugs like TKM-Ebola102 and
Brincidofovir,103 aimed at treating Ebola symptoms and a potential vac-
cine to prevent post-exposure spread of EVD.104  Similar to an EUA,
IND approval does not authorize general use.  Additional applications
related to other experimental drugs may be pending or denied.  Since
FDA does not disclose the existence of an IND application unless it has
been previously publicized,105 reliable data on the numbers of unap-
proved applications are unavailable.106
Facts surrounding ZMapp™, an experimental and expensive
drug107 that emerged as a treatment for EVD, are illustrative albeit
sketchy.  Dr. Kent Brantly was one of the first American doctors working
in West Africa to contract EVD and be transported back to the states for
life-saving treatment in August 2014.  He purportedly received doses of
ZMapp in West Africa prior to his hospitalization at Emory University
98. Ebola Response Updates from FDA, supra note 10.
99. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2013).
100. Ebola Response Updates from FDA, supra note 10.
101. Id.
102. About Investigational TKM-Ebola Therapeutic, TEKMIRA, http://www.tekmira
.com/pipeline/tkm-ebola.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
103. Press Release, Chimerix Announces Emergency Investigational New Drug
Applications for Brincidofovir Authorized by FDA for Patients With Ebola Virus Disease
(Oct. 6, 2014), available at http://ir.chimerix.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=874647.
104. Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Information for Clinicians in U.S. Healthcare Settings, U.S.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/clini-
cian-information-us-healthcare-settings.html (last updated Jan. 13, 2015).
105. 21 C.F.R. § 312.130.
106. 21 C.F.R. § 314.430.
107. Brent McClusky, Tobacco Plants Hold Key To Ebola Virus Cure ZMapp, THE FIX
(Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.thefix.com/content/tobacco-plants-hold-key-ebola-cure (“It
costs up to $100,000 to treat a single patient [with ZMapp] . . . .”).
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Hospital.108  Whether the administration of this drug was directly
approved by FDA is still something of a mystery.109  Though experts
surmise that FDA must have been involved in allowing the use of
ZMapp™, Brantly received his dose in Liberia,110 where FDA’s author-
ity to regulate exported, experimental (or other) drugs is lacking.111
The supply of ZMapp™, which was donated by its manufacturer to
patients at no cost, was reportedly exhausted later that same month.112
Months later, however, an additional HCW who contracted EVD work-
ing abroad, Dr. Martin Salia, received a dose of the drug in Nebraska in
November 2014, but later died.113  Whether FDA directly authorized or
approved the domestic administration of ZMapp™ to Dr. Malia or
other patients is not clear although no federal actions have been filed
against entities or HCWs who may have administered it to patients in
108. Dr. Sanjay Gupta & Danielle Dellorto, Experimental Drug Likely Saved Ebola
Patients, CNN (Aug. 5, 2014, 8:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/04/health/experi-
mental-ebola-serum/.
109. Staci Kearney, Ebola Epidemic Shines Light on Expanded Access, AGEIS (Nov. 24,
2014), http://aegiscreative.com/blog/ebola-epidemic-shines-light-expanded-access/
(“FDA will not say whether the use of ZMapp . . . was the result of an emergency-use
authorization, but some FDA involvement seems likely.”); Status Update on ZMapp, MAPP
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.mappbio.com/10-update.pdf (“ZMapp™
was available for compassionate use. . . . On September 2, Mapp Pharmaceutical received
a contract from the U.S. government through the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority (BARDA) to fund continued manufacture and clinical develop-
ment of ZMapp™ in accordance with FDA rules and regulations.  Clinical investigational
lots manufactured under this contract will be used in Phase 1-2 clinical studies evaluating
the safety and efficacy of ZMapp™.”).
110. Assoc. Press, FDA Lifts Hold on Experimental Ebola Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7,
2014, 6:06 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/08/07/us/politics/ap-us-
ebola-drug-fda-hold.html.
111. Exporting Drugs Does Not Need to Be Mission Impossible, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/
ucm314118.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2012) (“Companies may export unapproved drugs
to virtually anywhere. [But], there are requirements that must be met. Unapproved new
human drugs can be exported when it complies with the laws of the importing country
and has marketing authorization in certain other countries. . . .  When an unapproved
drug is first exported, the exporter must notify FDA and continue to maintain adequate
records.”). See also Guidance for Industry - Exports Under the FDA Export Reform and Enhance-
ment Act of 1996, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/ucm125799.htm#summary (last updated Aug. 5, 2014) (explaining that under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act § 801(e)(1), “a food, drug, device, or cos-
metic intended for export shall not be deemed to be adulterated or misbranded [and
therefore complies with general FDA export requirements] if the article: [1] Accords to
the specifications of the foreign purchaser; [2] Is not in conflict with the laws of the
country to which it is intended for export; [3] Is labeled on the outside of the shipping
package that it is intended for export; and [4] Is not sold or offered for sale in domestic
commerce”).
112. Press Release, Mapp Biopharmaceutical (Aug. 12, 2014), available at https://
web.archive.org/web /20140812203657/http://www.mappbio.com/.
113. Abby Phillip & Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, ‘Critical Threshold’: The Failed Race to
Save the Life of Ebola-Stricken Doctor Martin Salia, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/17/martin-salia-ebola-stricken-sur-
geon-from-sierra-leone-dies-in-nebraska-hospital/.
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the United States,114 suggesting FDA may have implicitly approved the
use of ZMapp™ in this limited circumstance.
CONCLUSION
As the Ebola outbreak in West Africa continues with known cases
exceeding 21,000, and deaths numbering nearly 8,500,115 limiting the
spread of cases of EVD globally and domestically is an international
goal that may be months or years in the making.  Against the backdrop
of EVD or other emerging infectious disease threats is the need to sepa-
rate myths from realities underlying legal preparedness and response.
Primary drivers for some of these myths include political whimsies,
media pressures, insufficient governance structures, legal misunder-
standings, and overzealous public officials and health authorities.  In
the end, this toxic mix of public health measures may be grounded
more so in fervor to respond than efficacy of results or legality to act.
From a public health  perspective, only those interventions known to
prevent the spread of infectious disease threats without significant, col-
lateral public health repercussions may be legally sustained.116
114. Though there is a lack of evidence that FDA sought sanctions against entities
or HCWs for their unlawful administration of ZMapp™, FDA has issued at least six warn-
ing letters to firms marketing products that purport to prevent, treat, or cure EVD infec-
tion. Ebola Response Updates from FDA, supra note 10.
115. EBOLA RESPONSE ROADMAP SITUATION REPORT UPDATE, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Jan. 14, 2015), available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/148237/2/road
mapsitrep_14Jan2015_eng.pdf?ua=1.
116. James G. Hodge, Jr., Global and Domestic Legal Preparedness and Response: 2014
Ebola Outbreak, 10 J. DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 1 (2014).
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